

VZCZCXRO2043

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FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1022  
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/CDR JTF-BRAVO IMMEDIATE  
RHMFISS/COMSOC SOUTH IMMEDIATE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001122

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [HO](#)

SUBJECT: TFH01: GETTING TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT BACK  
ON TRACK

¶1. (SBU) Summary. Implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement derailed on November 5 when President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya insisted on immediate restoration to office before creation of a national unity and reconciliation government and then modified this demand to having the Verification Commission request that Congress set a date for its consideration of his restoration to office. Zelaya refused to agree to issuance of a communique stating that both sides remained committed to implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement and had reached agreement on the mechanism for choosing the members of the national unity government. In response, de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti at midnight on November 5 announced that he had formed a government of national unity, but did not release its members' names. The Ambassador and the OAS representatives will convene both sides the morning of November 6 to attempt to get implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement back on track. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) After a full day of negotiations with the Ambassador and Organization of American States (OAS) representatives Jose Bordon and Enrique Correa, Verification Commission members Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina and Arturo Corrales agreed on November 5 to issue a communique stating that they remained committed to implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement, that they had reached agreement on the mechanism for choosing the members of the national unity and reconciliation government, and that each side had a list of names. Reina and Corrales agreed that discussion of the names on their lists would begin on November 6 and that the composition of the cabinet would be announced as soon as they had reached agreement. Reina and Rodil Rivera, one of the negotiators for President Zelaya at the Guaymuras talks who accompanied Reina to the meetings with the Ambassador and the OAS, took the draft communique to President Zelaya to obtain his approval. President Zelaya insisted that without a clear path to his restoration to office, he would not agree to formation of the national unity government. Zelaya pressed the Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa for restitution to be granted immediately, effectively linking Article 1 of the Agreement regarding configuration of a national unity government and Article 5 regarding Zelaya's restoration to office. President Zelaya subsequently modified his demand to having the Verification Commission request that Congress set a date for its consideration of his restoration to office. Zelaya refused to agree to issuance of the draft communique or to allow discussion of the names on both sides' lists. De facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti did agree to issuance of the communique and instructed his regime

cabinet ministers to present their resignations.

¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa persuaded Reina, as per guidance from Verification Commission members Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and former President of Chile Ricardo Lagos, that the "step by step" approach would be best. Once agreement was reached on a national unity government, the mechanism for swearing in the government would be discussed and decided on. Once the new cabinet was sworn in, Micheletti would be required to step down. The Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa told Reina that once Micheletti and his regime no longer existed, President Zelaya would have the best chance for the Congress to consider the question of his restoration in a rational manner, providing the best prospects for a successful vote. Reina and Rivera were unable to convince Zelaya to accept this approach. The Ambassador also unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Zelaya, but Zelaya argued that he did not believe that Micheletti would step down and that efforts to placate Micheletti would only lead to the loss of prestige by the OAS and the international community.

¶4. (SBU) Micheletti convened a press conference at midnight on November 5 and announced he had formed a government of national unity, but did not release its members' names. The presumption in the country was that Micheletti was going to run the government of national unity, but Micheletti did say that he was still open to receiving suggested names for the Cabinet from Zelaya.

¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador and the OAS representatives will convene both sides the morning of November 6 to attempt to

TEGUCIGALP 00001122 002 OF 002

get implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement back on track. The Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa will urge them to issue a communique stating that, although differences exist, they are committed to resolving them and implementing the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement in good faith.  
LLORENS